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Robot Transparency, Trust and Utility
Robert H. Wortham1, Andreas Theodorou2and Joanna J. Bryson3
Abstract. As robot reasoning becomes more complex, debugging
becomes increasingly hard based solely on observable behaviour,
even for robot designers and technical specialists. Similarly, non-
specialist users find it hard to create useful mental models of robot
reasoning solely from observed behaviour. The EPSRC Principles of
Robotics mandate that our artefacts should be transparent, but what
does this mean in practice, and how does transparency affect both
trust and utility? We investigate this relationship in the literature and
find it to be complex, particularly in non industrial environments
where transparency may have a wider range of effects on trust and
utility depending on the application and purpose of the robot. We
outline our programme of research to support our assertion that it is
nevertheless possible to create transparent agents that are emotion-
ally engaging despite having a transparent machine nature.
1 INTRODUCTION
The EPSRC Principles of Robotics includes a specific reference to
transparency: “Robots are manufactured artefacts. They should not
be designed in a deceptive way to exploit vulnerable users; instead
their machine nature should be transparent.” see [1]. This initially
appears to be a straightforward normative assertion, drawing on the
commonly held idea that agents should not be deceptive, since de-
ception generally leads to exploitation. This paper considers whether
in fact transparency is really such a simple idea, and also whether
making certain types of agents transparent reduces their utility. In
considering this question, we must also address the relationship be-
tween transparency and trust.
In this paper, we use the terms robot and agent interchangeably
and by these terms we mean an embodied, autonomous intelligent
artefact.
What does it mean to trust a robot? We might initially simply as-
sert that if an AI is more transparent, then we are able to trust it more,
and therefore its utility increases. We could also argue that trust is
only required when an agent is not fully transparent, and therefore
that increased transparency reduces the need for trust [4]. If the util-
ity of an artefact is measured by the degree to which it is trusted,
then increasing transparency may reduce that utility. This might, for
example, be the case for a robot that’s primary function is to provide
companionship.
So, we start to see that there is a complex relationship between the
ideas of utility, transparency and trust. This relationship will depend
on the purpose of the AI. In this paper we review the literature relat-
ing to transparency and trust, and we also describe ongoing practical
research to investigate the proposal that it is indeed possible build an
emotionally engaging yet transparent robot.
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2 THEORY OF MIND, TRUST AND
TRANSPARENCY
Although we may presuppose that communication between animals,
and particularly between humans must be complex, in fact natural
communication systems tend to exploit relatively simple and min-
imal signals, the meaning of which derives from extensive models
[16]. In other words, evolution, or a shared phylogenetic history,
provides adequate priors such that minimal data is required to com-
municate context. Although some would argue otherwise [8], it is
generally agreed that effective interaction, whether coercion or co-
operation, relies on each party having some theory-of-mind (ToM) of
the other [16, 14]. Individual actions and composite behaviours are
thus interpreted within a pre-existing ToM framework. Whether that
ToM is accurate is unimportant, provided that it is predictive in terms
of behaviour. The robot’s transparency model does not define the
ToM employed by the human user, but it is the transparency model
that we can directly adjust and this is therefore the focus of this pa-
per. It is well known that observable behaviour can communicate the
internal mental states of the individual. Breazeal [2] found that im-
plicit non-verbal communication improves transparency over that of
only deliberate non-verbal communication. Here implicit is defined
as conveying information inherent in behaviour but which is not de-
liberately communicated by the robot designer. People have strong
expectations for how implicit and explicit non-verbal cues map to
mental states. Breazeal also found that transparency reduces conflict
when errors occur, particularly when a joint task is being attempted.
Reduced conflict implies that when an error occurs during task ex-
ecution, recovery is still possible with less apportionment of blame.
Breazeal terms this reduced conflict Robustness, and this robustness
is one effective measure of utility.
2.1 Anthropomorphism and Mental Models of
Robots
Humans have a strong predisposition to anthropomorphise not only
nature, but anything around them [5] — the Social Brain Hypothe-
sis [7] may explain this phenomenon, however humans do not treat
robots identically to humans, for example with respect to moral
standing [10]. Although there is significant debate about the ontology
of robot minds versus human minds, what is of more practical impor-
tance is how robot minds are understood psychologically by humans,
i.e. what is the perceived, rather than actual, ontology. Stubbs [15]
considers it essential to form a mental model of robots in order to
build common ground — which we might also interpret as the basis
for human trust. Stubbs [15] also found that this common ground can
be effectively established via an interactive dialogue with the robot.
Although this study primarily considered remote robots working in
an industrial or exploratory setting, rather than robots operating in
domestic environments, we should take note of the importance of di-
alogue in establishing trust. Indeed Mueller [13] sees dialogue as one
of the three main characteristics of transparent computers, the others
being explanation and learning.
Meerbeek [12] investigates the relationship between a robot’s per-
ceived personality and the level to which the user feels in control
during the interaction. In order to be believable, Meerbeek found that
the personality expression should be linked to an internal model that
deals with the behaviour (e.g. decision making) based on personality
and emotion. More expressive, informal behaviour is associated with
a higher perception of user control.
Non-specialist humans either have little ToM for robots, or have
a model based on contemporary science fiction, and therefore inter-
pret behaviours using a default other agent theory, which assumes
the agent to share human-like motivations. This can be understood
in evolutionary terms through our ancestors’ need to rapidly cate-
gorise proximal activity as either neutral (the rustling of leaves in
the wind), friendly (the approach of a tribe member) or hostile (the
approach of a predator or foe). When sensory information is uncer-
tain, evolving a bias towards an assumption of both agency and hos-
tility is selective for individual longevity in an environment where
one is frequently the prey, not the predator. Even in our technolog-
ical environments we often experience fake agency, such as robotic
dialling sales calls, automated twitter postings and auto-generated
personalised spam emails.
In a study conducted in 2006 in a community hospital in the
USA, the nursing staff were constantly searching for reasons why
the robots acted as they did. They would ask themselves and others,
“What is going on here? Is the robot supposed to do this or did I do
something wrong?”. This research asserts that low levels of trans-
parency led people to question even the normal behaviours of the
robot, sometimes even leading people to think of correct behaviours
as errors [11].
3 RESEARCH PROGRAMME
We are beginning a programme of practical research to investigate
the transparency, trust, utility triangle. Initially using non-humanoid
robots, we are conducting experiments to determine the effect of var-
ious expressions of transparency on the emotional response of hu-
mans. At the heart of our experiments we are using reactive plan-
ning techniques to build autonomous agents. We have developed the
Instinct reactive planner based on Bryson’s Behaviour Oriented De-
sign (BOD) approach [3]. The Instinct planner reports the execution
and status of every plan element in real time, allowing us to implic-
itly capture the reasoning process within the robot that gives rise to
its behaviour. Our experiments will investigate and demonstrate how
this transparency data from the planner can be used to make the be-
haviour of the robot more understandable. Initially we are primarily
interested in making the behaviour transparent for the robot designer,
since robots with complex plans are typically very hard to design and
debug. However, these initial experiments may also improve trans-
parency for non-specialist observers.
We will subsequently investigate how we can harness the trans-
parency mechanism embedded with the Instinct Planner to produce a
more effective domestic robot. The research will investigate whether
transparency makes people feel more or less bonded to their robot,
and whether they are more or less able to accurately assess the needs
of the robot, as it works to achieve its goals.
It is anticipated that these trials should take place within a do-
mestic or near-domestic environment, such as a retirement home.
We must gain feedback from non-specialist observers/users about
the qualitative level of intelligence of the robot, and also about how
comfortable they would be to have such a device in their home en-
vironment. The research will attempt to assess initial levels of fear,
anxiety, mistrust of AI and robots in general, and of domestic robots
in particular. Having established a reference position, transparency
of the robot must be enabled by providing feedback to the user based
on the real time execution within the reactive planner. The methods
we currently envisage are:
• Real-time presentation of textual statements relating to plan exe-
cution.
• Graphical real-time visualisation of plan execution.
• Audio (i.e. verbal) statements relating to robot plan execution.
For each of these methods the transparency information could either
be presented on/from a remote device, or on/from the robot itself.
There are thus six possible combinations. Of course additional trans-
parency fusion, such as audio combined with graphical, could also be
tested based on the success or failure of initial experimental results.
As the literature indicates that dialogue is important in establishing
trust, this research should give some consideration to the possibility
of accepting speech input, albeit restricted to simple commands, as a
means for users to inquire of the robot what it is doing, and to have
the robot respond appropriately.
4 DISCUSSION
EPSRC Principle 1 asserts that robots are tools. Within industrial and
engineering environments this is fairly clear, in the sense that a hu-
man uses the robot to complete a technical task. The designer and
user of the robot share the goal of the robot: to complete the task.
However, within domestic and healthcare environments, robots may
have rather a different relationship with those they interact with. They
may be intended to provide companionship and simultaneous covert
monitoring of patient well-being. They may be tools for the health-
care professional, but for the patient they are companions. In such
an environment the utility may be negatively affected by increased
transparency. Our sense of companionship is related to the measure
of agency we project onto the robot. If we are able to understand the
workings of the intelligence does it inherently appear to become less
intelligent in the folk sense, such that we then project less agency, and
as a result experience less benefit from the robot? We might compare
this with television. We know it has no agency, but its presence in
the corner of our sitting room does provide companion like benefits.
Maybe this has to do with the conscious suspension of disbelief, or
maybe we have an unconscious agency detector which is more easily
fooled by technology.
Common-sense notions of intelligence are conflated with folk psy-
chology ideas of agency and also of living. Things that are intelligent
are alive, in the sense that they have their own beliefs, desires and in-
tentions that we understand are fundamentally self serving, or selfish.
We implicitly recognise selfishness as a fundamental characteristic of
all life [6]. If such an agent engages with us then it considers us to be
important in the pursuit of these selfish objectives. Such agents are
worthy of becoming our companions because they ascribe true value
in their relationship with us, and this increases our value in society.
Conversely, agents who have no self-serving agency are not worthy
of our attention because they convey no social value. Perhaps there-
fore, artificial agents whose sole purpose is companionship and are
truly transparent in this respect are thus disqualified from being wor-
thy companions. In some situations robot transparency may therefore
be at odds with utility, and more generally it may be orthogonal rather
than beneficial to the successful use of the robot. Whilst we may in-
vent scenarios and continue to discuss the theoretical and philosoph-
ical interplay between transparency, trust and utility, as scientists we
await the outcome of our experiments.
5 CONCLUSION
We have seen that unpacking transparency and trust is complex, but
can be partly understood by looking at how humans come to under-
stand and subsequently trust one another, and how they overcome
evolutionary fears in order to trust other agents, through implicit
non-verbal communication. Unacceptable levels of anxiety, fear and
mistrust will result in an emotional and cognitive response to reject
robots. Hancock [9] asserts that if we cannot trust our robots, we will
not be able to benefit from them effectively. However, given that we
happily interact in society with others whom we do not completely
trust, and increasingly we interact with computers knowing that their
recommendations maybe faulty, we must conclude that Hancock is
over simplifying. Finally, there may be applications where trans-
parency is at odds with utility. Our ongoing programme of research
is intended to validate our hypothesis that we can indeed create trans-
parent robots that are nevertheless emotionally engaging and useful
tools across a wide range of domestic and near-domestic environ-
ments. Meanwhile, there remains a great of work to be done to un-
pack the relationship between transparency, utility and trust.
REFERENCES
[1] Margaret Boden, Joanna Bryson, Darwin Caldwell, Kerstin Dauten-
hahn, Lilian Edwards, Sarah Kember, Paul Newman, Vivienne Parry,
Geoff Pegman, Tom Rodden, Tom Sorell, Mick Wallis, Blay Whitby,
and Alan Winfield. Principles of robotics. The United Kingdom’s Engi-
neering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), April 2011.
web publication.
[2] C. Breazeal, C.D. Kidd, A.L. Thomaz, G. Hoffman, and M. Berlin,
‘Effects of nonverbal communication on efficiency and robustness in
human-robot teamwork’, in 2005 IEEE/RSJ International Conference
on Intelligent Robots and Systems, pp. 708–713, Alberta, Canada,
(2005). Ieee.
[3] Joanna J. Bryson, ‘Intelligence by design: principles of modularity and
coordination for engineering complex adaptive agents’, (2001).
[4] Joanna J Bryson and Paul Rauwolf, ‘Trust, Communication, and In-
equality’. 2016.
[5] Kerstin Dautenhahn, ‘Methodology & themes of human-robot inter-
action: A growing research field’, International Journal of Advanced
Robotic Systems, 4(1 SPEC. ISS.), 103–108, (2007).
[6] Richard Dawkins, ‘Hierarchical organisation: A candidate principle for
ethology’, in Growing Points in Ethology, eds., P. P. G. Bateson and
R. A. Hinde, 7–54, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1976).
[7] R I M Dunbar, ‘The Social Brain Hypothesis’, Evolutionary Anthropol-
ogy, 178–190, (1998).
[8] Shaun Gallagher, ‘The narrative alternative to theory of mind’, in Rad-
ical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative, ed.,
R Menary, number Gallagher 2001, 223–229, John Benjamins, Ams-
terdam, (2006).
[9] P. a. Hancock, D. R. Billings, K. E. Schaefer, J. Y. C. Chen, E. J.
de Visser, and R. Parasuraman, ‘A Meta-Analysis of Factors Affecting
Trust in Human-Robot Interaction’, Human Factors: The Journal of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 53(5), 517–527, (2011).
[10] Peter H. Kahn, Hiroshi Ishiguro, Batya Friedman, and Takayuki Kanda,
‘What is a human? - Toward psychological benchmarks in the field of
human-robot interaction’, Proceedings - IEEE International Workshop
on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, 3, 364–371, (2006).
[11] Taemie Kim and Pamela Hinds, ‘Who should I blame? Effects of au-
tonomy and transparency on attributions in human-robot interaction’,
Proceedings - IEEE International Workshop on Robot and Human In-
teractive Communication, 80–85, (2006).
[12] Bernt Meerbeek, Jettie Hoonhout, Peter Bingley, and Jacques Terken,
‘Investigating the relationship between the personality of a robotic TV
assistant and the level of user control’, Proceedings - IEEE Interna-
tional Workshop on Robot and Human Interactive Communication,
404–410, (2006).
[13] Erik T. Mueller, Transparent Computers: Designing Understandable
Intelligent Systems, Erik T. Mueller, San Bernardino, CA, 2016.
[14] Rebecca Saxe, Laura E Schulz, and Yuhong V Jiang, ‘Reading minds
versus following rules: dissociating theory of mind and executive con-
trol in the brain.’, Social neuroscience, 1(3-4), 284–98, (jan 2006).
[15] Kristen Stubbs, Pamela J Hinds, and David Wettergreen, ‘Autonomy
and Common Ground in Human-Robot Interaction: A Field Study’,
IEEE Intelligent Systems, 22(2), 42–50, (2007).
[16] Robert H Wortham and Joanna J Bryson, ‘Communication’, in Hand-
book of Living Machines {in press.}, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
(2016).
